[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.If external threats diminish, our defense effortcan be reduced, and vice versa.If China becomes a superpower, the doctrinecan be revised to reflect this situation when it arises.In some ways, of course, the resurrection of Strategic Independence asthe cornerstone of U.S.security policy isn’t new.Defense officials alwaysclaim to provide as much security as possible with the resources at theirdisposal.During the Cold War, when MAD seemed better than a preemptivefirst strike or a destabilizing arms race, it allowed us to realize acceptablelevels of security even though the realities of Soviet military power severelyP1: FCW0521857449c13Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:6Strategic Independence: An Ounce of Prevention311constrained our room for maneuver.But MAD is no longer adequate.Itcannot serve as a rational basis for our international security agenda outsidethe periphery of Russia’s vital interests, and doesn’t apply in the same senseas before in Russia because the Kremlin’s strategic options have changed.Russia cannot engage the United States in a nuclear arms race, and no longerneeds us to be as vulnerable as we were during the cold war to pursue its newsecurity agenda.Strategic Independence in its contemporary guise thus isn’tprovocative.It is simply a matter of taking the opportunities created by theglobal reconfiguration of wealth and power, instead of foolishly preservingvulnerabilities that no longer serve valid security purposes.The Clinton administration’s argument for a limited national missiledefense directed at the states in the Crescent of Fire took the following form.When Reagan proposed NMD, it was to protect us from the Soviet’s manymissiles, but it wasn’t possible technically.In addition, the Soviets couldhave countered our effort by building more missiles, overwhelming what-ever defensive shield we could erect.But when the Clinton administrationproposed NMD a decade later, the situation had changed.North Korea was obtaining nuclear ballistic missiles (its Taepedong 1missile has a range of almost five thousand miles) and to fail to constructa shield would make the United States vulnerable to North Korean nuclearattack.This is unthinkable.Technology today probably permits a shield tobe built either from the ground or from space against North Korean missiles,so it ought to be built.Yet today’s situation offers even greater opportunity.A shield can be builtwhich would go beyond protecting us against Crescent of Fire states, andwould provide partial protection against Russia and China as well.Further,although the Russians are modernizing their strategic weapons, they areso much weakened that they lack the option to build so many additionalmissiles that they will simply overwhelm our defenses.In addition, manyof the current Russian missiles have passed beyond their service life, reduc-ing further Russia’s ability to overcome an American NMD.With nuclearproliferation, we even risk getting caught in an exchange of missiles notintended for us.From this an NMD could help protect us.NMD will notbe perfect overnight; it may not be perfect ever.It doesn’t have to be perfectto be very useful; it only has to provide superior defense capabilities forthe amount invested than any other option that costs the same amount.The goal isn’t a fail-safe system, but it must be a system that is reasonablyfunctional.Otherwise, in the age of tiny cameras on cell phones, advancedspying technologies, more accurate satellite surveillance capabilities, and theinternet, the Russians and the Chinese will be quite educated as to NMD’sP1: FCW0521857449c13Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:6312The American Responseactual ability to shoot down enemy missiles, so they won’t be intimidatedunless it is technologically superior.A technically successful system placedon earth or in space will be positive protection against the irrationality ofCrescent of Fire states, and intimidation against the Russians and Chinesewho would be pressed for different reasons to build so many missiles anddecoys that they can overcome the system in the foreseeable future.In thisregard it is important to appreciate that NMD has no downside other thancost.It cannot increase the Russian threat, and could deter China from try-ing to become a nuclear superpower, if China can be brought to recognizethat the effort will be futile.NMD is not a panacea.As with all new systems it can be degraded if need-lessly constrained by obsolete arms control treaties designed for a bipolarenvironment, but the diversity of the risks we now face makes it essential forleaders to extricate themselves from the Cold War mindset, and the utopi-anism of those gullible enough to believe that universal disarmament is aneffective antidote for national aggression.The editors of The Economist expressed reservations about NMD, sayingthat if Bush handled the diplomacy wrong, Americans could end up with“the worst of all worlds: one in which suspicion and rivalry, not securityand stability, were the name of the game.”3 But, of course, that is where we already are, and so the NMD is necessary.Criticism is strong, especially from the Chinese, that putting weaponsin space as part of a missile defense system is actually an offensive systemintended to intimidate other countries (especially China) and will lead toan arms race in space.Instead, there should be an agreement among thenations to demilitarize space, it is asserted.4The two major arguments against NMD are:r it won’t work, andr it is destabilizing.Often, these are cited simultaneously.But they are inconsistent [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]