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.THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEWSoon after coming to power in May 1997, the Labour Government embarked on aStrategic Defence Review (SDR).In view of the work recently completed it might beexpected that missile defence would feature prominently in a thorough-going review ofBritain s security needs and the means to address them.In fact, the opposite proved to bethe case.This was foreshadowed whilst the SDR process itself was still going on.One defence source said in November 1997: Even if this [BMD] has not been abandonedcompletely, it has been kicked into the long grass. 52 The International Institute forStrategic Studies (IISS) reported that MoD and Foreign and Commonwealth Officeofficials agree that the Review will not recommend any significant new expenditure onsatellite intelligence-gathering hardware or ballistic-missile-defence systems , on thegrounds that the UK was unlikely to conduct major operations alone.53 Dr John Reid, ajunior Defence Minister, stated, however, that BMD was being examined in the SDR, butthat no decisions had yet been taken:It is as well to remind ourselves of the risks to not only regional but globalsecurity posed by the proliferation of missiles and the development ofweapons of mass destruction&In considering the missile threats faced by the United Kingdom, it isprobably helpful to distinguish between three areas: the United Kingdomitself, the territory of our NATO allies, and the territory outside theNATO area&In the immediate future, the risks lie mainly outside the NATO area,particularly the middle east, the near east and north Africa&& the protection of deployed forces is a more immediate concern thanthe protection of the United Kingdom itself.54Once published in July 1998, the Report on the SDR55 confirmed that the subject had,notwithstanding Reid s earlier comments, indeed been sidelined.References to missileproliferation and BMD were sparse.Scattered phrases outlined the potential securityproblem:There is an increasing danger from the proliferation of nuclear, biologicaland chemical technologies& (p.5)& today s security environment is not benign& (p.8)& the presence and potential spread of ballistic missiles, chemical andbiological weapons and even nuclear weapons add to the risks.(p.11)A Supporting Essay on Deterrence, Arms Control and Proliferation stated: After the cold war 173& we need military capabilities to address the risks to British forcesdeployed overseas posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons andtheir means of delivery.To do otherwise would be an unacceptableconstraint on our political freedom of action and could put our people atundue risk.(p.5 15)However, Britain would not, for the moment, acquire active defences:A number of systems intended to destroy ballistic missiles are underdevelopment, notably in the United States.These may play a role within abalanced spectrum of capabilities to counter the risks posed by chemicaland biological weapons and their means of delivery.But technologies inthis area are changing rapidly and it would, at this stage, be premature todecide on acquiring such a capability.We will, however, monitordevelopments in the risks posed by ballistic missiles and in the technologyavailable to counter them, participate in NATO studies and work closelywith our allies to inform future decisions.(p.5 15)The Review concluded thatwe do not need to procure a new ground launched medium or long-rangeair defence missile.We& have established a technology developmentprogramme to keep this option open& if a new ballistic missile threat tothis country were to emerge.(p.38)The SDR was therefore consistent with earlier policy under the Conservatives in tyingBMD acquisition to a threat to the UK itself, notwithstanding that the protection ofdeployed forces was acknowledged as being more urgent and SDR s commitment to an expeditionary strategy.The PFS s identification of several possible missile defencearchitectures now looked rather premature [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]